Speaking at the Holy Defense Museum in Tehran on October 19, IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi said seven major internet cables run beneath the Strait of Hormuz and that “all internet and commercial data” passes through them. In the same remarks, carried by state-aligned media, he said the Guards would unveil “new targets” and “new weapons,” and vowed to “sweep the remnants of American power from the region.”

He did not say outright that the cables would be attacked. The message was understood all the same: Qatar’s foreign ministry responded the next day, warning that any disruption to the internet would affect every state in the region.

The remarks follow a proposal floated in May by the IRGC-affiliated outlets Tasnim and Fars that Iran charge fees to the companies whose cables cross Hormuz, and monitor the data they carry. The cables are laid largely in Omani waters, leaving Tehran no obvious legal basis for either.

Analysis: leverage by threat

Threatening internet infrastructure is not a show of strength. It is what a state reaches for when its conventional leverage is shrinking. The cables carry the traffic of the Gulf states Tehran says it wants good relations with, along with the region’s banks, ports and airlines. Cutting them, or credibly threatening to, would hurt Iran’s neighbors far more than the United States.

The threat also mirrors how the regime treats connectivity at home. Inside Iran, the internet is switched off when the state moves against its people, and Starlink terminals have been declared a possible “legitimate military target.” Mohebbi’s remarks extend the same logic outward: connectivity is a weapon, and other people’s access is a hostage.

Photo: SNN.